Abstract: Although the visible light communication (VLC) channel has superior security than radio frequency channels, its broadcast character makes VLC links vulnerable to eavesdropping. Therefore, VLC networks need to support security to protect the user's data against its eavesdroppers. Keyless security approaches have been proposed to provide security for VLC in the literature. Although these approaches support good security against eavesdroppers, they require complicated implementation. Algorithms of keys generation are essential to secure wireless links. Nevertheless, the common keys generation algorithms can be very complex and costly in many setups. They use up limited resources such as bandwidth. In this paper, we enhance the confidentiality of VLC networks by suggesting a new key extraction protocol for optical orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) schemes in an indoor environment. We introduce to extract keys from the bipolar OFDM samples produced from optical OFDM schemes. We propose to allocate a portion of cyclic prefix samples placed in the area of low channel impact for keys extraction throughout session duration. The introduced protocol extracts keys for the medium access control (MAC) level and the physical level. It supports high physical-layer security as every OFDM signal frame is encrypted by a various key. Thus, the encryption at the MAC level can be switched off beyond any danger in security. This setup can improve the throughput of the system because it decreases the processing delay in the upper layer process. Also, the presented protocol supports zero bit mismatch rates with key extraction on the fly. Index Terms: Key extraction, physical layer security, optical orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM), visible light communication (VLC).
Introduction
The request for wireless data services is increasing exponentially. Although the enhancements in present cellular paradigms, the need for mobile data throughput surpass the supply as the usable radio frequency (RF) spectrum is too restricted. Thus, an extension of the wireless communications spectrum to include the visible light spectrum is very attractive.
Visible light communication (VLC) network like light-fidelity (Li-Fi) [1] is a continuity of the tendency to adopt higher frequencies in the electromagnetic field (visible light spectrum). In VLC network, light emitting diodes (LEDs) are applied for a high data rates wireless connection. In [2] , [3] , data rates more than 3 Gb/s have been established via a lone micro-light emitting diode (μLED). Owing to the contemporary spread of LED lighting in indoor environments, such as homes, hospital, and offices, and in outdoor environments, such as traffic lights, on account of their power-efficiency, there is an additional advantage for Li-Fi cellular implementation in which it can set up on the extant lighting structure. Li-Fi technology utilizes the lighting infrastructure to support wholly networked wireless communication [4] .
In VLC, the intensity Modulation/Direct Detection (IM/DD) is employed as optical carrier modulation. It indicates that only the signal intensity can be transmitted. This confines the sort of modulation schemes that can be utilized. Systems such as On-Off Keying (OOK), Pulse Position Modulation (PPM), and Pulse Amplitude Modulation (PAM) can be employed in a direct manner in optical wireless communication (OWC). However, when transmission rates increases, Inter-symbol interference (ISI) becomes a major source of bit error rates. So orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) is the most powerful modulation system to support high-spectral efficiency and to combat ISI. OFDM can use a simple equalizer with a single tap in the frequency domain for equalization [5] , [6] . Although their advantages, the OFDM signals in OWC cannot be sent directly like in RF networks because of the requirements of (IM/DD) that require the signal to be unipolar and real for transmission. So Hermitian symmetry on the carriers in the frequency domain must be imposed to generate real OFDM signals. The former literatures propose many techniques to modify the conventional OFDM such as DCO-OFDM, ACO-OFDM to generate real time domain signals [7] - [11] .
Security is a critical issue in any fully networked (multiuser access) wireless systems for protecting users' information [12] . In [13] and [14] , the security aspects in VLC are highlighted as defined in the IEEE 802.15.7 standard. In [15] - [20] , physical-layer security methods for VLC are proposed, contingent on keyless-security protocols. They used beamforming and friendly jamming methods to secure the user data. Despite these methods improves the security link of VLC, they need to estimate the eavesdropper's channel or physical position at the time of communication, which is not always attainable practically and leads to a very complicated implementation. In this paper, we introduce a novel security protocol for VLC contingent on a key-generation approach applicable to optical OFDM technique.
Various works [21] - [28] reviewed in [29] capitalize on the properties of the wireless channels to produce secret keys from the envelope of the signal to provide a security for wireless radio connections. Two channel parameters are used for keys generation: channel state information (CSI) and received signal strength (RSS). These approaches mitigate the difficulty of key management occurring in conventional cryptographic protocols [30] . Unluckily, VLC is insusceptible to fast fading and is exclusively susceptible to slow fading in the model of path loss and log-normal shadowing. Accordingly, it is not reasonable to utilize the properties of the optical channel to generate keys for secrecy.
In this paper, we utilize a new approach for producing keys. Secret keys are generated from bipolar real OFDM samples at the output of optical OFDM schemes. Different from the scheme in [31] , where the receiver needs to operate as a receiver-jammer two-fold mode for jamming several OFDM samples for the purpose of keys extraction, the receiver in our scheme does not need to operate in a various mode. Therefore, the user's handset in our protocol has a small intricacy. The suggested protocol accomplishes a strong computational security against passive adversaries in the physical layer and also it performs zero bit mismatch rates with keys extraction on the fly. This paper is an extended version of our paper in [32] . We introduce this version with more clear results and discussions in comparison to its short version. The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. The principle of our protocol is presented in section II. Section III describes our protocol in details. Key disagreement rate and channel effect are introduced in section IV. Computational Security of the proposed protocol is presented in Section V. Section VI introduces the encryption at the MAC level. Numerical Results and discussion are presented in Section VII. Section VIII concludes the paper. Fig. 1 illustrates a conventional discrete-time real bipolar OFDM signal S i (t). This signal is produced at the output of an optical OFDM by employing Hermitian symmetry on the carriers in the frequency domain. A secret key k i is generated according to the polarity of the OFDM samples of S i (t) as shown in Fig. 1 . This key is utilized to encrypt the coming signal S i + 1 (t) utilizing the multiplication process before it is sent through a channel. Prior to the encryption of S i + 1 (t), a secret key k i +1 is extracted from the samples of S i + 1 (t) to encrypt the subsequent signal S i + 2 (t).
Principle

The Description of the Proposed Protocol
This section describes the proposed protocol in detail.
At the Connection setup
The primary key k 0 utilized to encrypt the initial OFDM signal S 1 (t) can be securely obtained at the time of the communication establishment, utilizing the following approaches: 1) Replicated multiplication by random keys may be applied. The mechanism is achieved by three duplicated transmissions along these lines:
r Transmitter, called Alice, multiplies an arbitrary training OFDM signal S 0 with a random key g TX . Then Alice transmits the resultant signal (S 0 . * g TX ) to the receiver, called Bob, where ".
* " indicates to the element-wise multiplication process and S 0 is the vector model of the signal S 0 (t). A primary key k 0 is generated at Alice from S 0 (t) prior to it is multiplied by g TX .
r Bob multiplies the signal (S 0 . * g TX ) upon the reception by a random key g R X and then re-transmits the outcome signal (S 0 . * g TX ).
* g R X once more to Alice.
r Alice re-multiplies the signal ((S 0 . * g TX ).
* g R X ) upon reception again by g TX and then retransmits the outcome signal ((S 0 .
* g TX ).
* g R X ). * g TX = (S 0 . * g R X ) once more to Alice.
r Finally, Bob multiplies the signal (S 0 . * g R X ) upon reception by g R X to extract the clean signal ((S 0 . * g R X ). * g R X =S 0 ). From S 0 (t), a primary secret key k 0 is obtained at Bob for decryption processes. 2) If a prior communication between Alice and Bob was done, they may employ the latest secret keys utilized just before clearing the communication link. The primary key k 0 may be utilized being a private key (rather than the symmetric/antisymmetric key employed in common cryptographic algorithms [30] ) for the higher layers like medium access control (MAC) level to encrypt the frames (K 1 , . . . . . . . . . .K m ), where m is the total frames number needed to be transmitted over the VLC channels. Likewise, k 0 is applied to encrypt the initial OFDM signal S 1 (t) by the process of multiplication.
There are various models for optical OFDM schemes: DC biased optical OFDM (DCO-OFDM), asymmetrically clipped optical OFDM (ACO-OFDM) [10] , and auxiliary models dependent on DCO-OFDM and ACO-OFDM. In case of ACO-OFDM, the time domain OFDM signal S 0 has the property of anti-symmetry [10] . As a result, the key k 0 will retain the property of anti-symmetry too. In contrast, the time-domain OFDM signal in DCO-OFDM do not have any property of symmetry or anti-symmetry. Therefore, k 0 will not retain such property either. So, the secrecy achieved by k 0 in DCO-OFDM is higher than the secrecy achieved by k 0 in ACO-OFDM. As a consequence, we choose DCO-OFDM model to evaluate our security protocol.
At the Session Period
After the time of communication setup is finished, the session time begins. Let K i +1 be the present frame at Alice in the period of communication over session time. This frame is encrypted by the primary key k 0 to generate an encrypted frame (
, which is moved to the physical layer for sending. Let S i +1 be the present OFDM signal generated at the output of an optical OFDM modulator after Hermitian symmetry for the modulated complex symbols obtained from the output of M-QAM modulator to get a real bipolar signal using IFFT operation. This signal contains two sections: cyclic prefix (CP) signal S The encrypted signalS i +1 is produced by element-wise multiplication process by the key k i generated from the preceding CP signal S C i as
A direct continuous (DC) offset level is added toS i +1 before sending. The DC bias, designated by i bi as , is related to the standard deviation ofS i + 1 (t) as [10] 
where μ is a proportionality constant, and i bi as is determined as a bias of 10.log 10 (μ 2 + 1) dB. After adding the DC bias, any surplus negative samples are truncated.
AT Bob, the received signal is given as
where h is the channel impulse response, r is responsivity of the detector, the sign ⊗ refers to convolution operation, and n is additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) which collectively models thermal noise and shot noise. Thermal noise has a noise power spectral density (PSD) of N 0 , it is zero mean and has a variance of σ 2 ther mal = N 0 W sc , where W sc is the bandwidth of each OFDM subcarrier. Shot noise [5] has a variance of σ 2 sh ot = 2Q e r P r W sc + 2Q e I bg I 2 W sc , where Q e is the electronic charge, P r is the received optical power, I bg is background current, and I 2 is the noise bandwidth factor.
The DC bias i bi as is then eliminated fromZ i +1 . Afterward, the clipped signal is element-wise multiplied with the secret key k i to produce the decrypted signal Z i +1 as The decrypted signal Z i +1 is then demodulated by an N-point fast Fourier transform (FFT) as
where n is the noise level after FFT process. In line-of-sight channel with no reflection, H represents the DC gain H (0) from Alice (Access point) to Bob (destined user). It is computed in [33] as
where m stands for the Lambertian emission order given by m = −ln(2)/ln(cos(∅ 1/2 )). The parameter ∅ 1/2 denotes the half-power semi-angle of the LED, A p d is the physical area of Bob's photodetector, d stands for the Euclidean distance between Alice and Bob, ∅ is the light radiance angle and ϕ is the light incidence angle.
In multipath channel with k reflections, time domain impulse response is given in [34] as
where S is a particular source, R is a particular receiver in a room with reflectors, N is the overall number of reflecting parts in a room,n is the normal to the source surface S at position r, ρ i is the element reflectivity at position r,
is the orientation of the source S, and r s is the position of the source. Since the decryption keys are generated from the OFDM signals upon reception, an equalizer in the head of the receiver ought to be utilized to eliminate the impact of fading channel before generating keys. This approach is involved to decrease the probability of key disagreement rate (KDR). Assuming zero forcing (ZF) equalizer, the received OFDM signal is given as
The equalized signalZ equ(i +1) is then multiplied by the correspondent k i as
After that, the next key k i +1 that will retrieve the later OFDM signal Z equ(i +2) is extracted from the decrypted OFDM signal Z equ(i +1) . Eventually, Z equ(i +1) is delivered to FFT process and quadrature amplitude modulator (QAM) to recover the user's data. The encrypted frameK i +1 is produced from the output of the physical level and the clean frame (
is obtained after decryption operation utilizing the primary key k 0 at MAC layer as depicted in Fig. 3. 
Key disagreement Rate and Channel Effect
The bit key disagreement rate is termed as the number of bits that do not agree between Alice and Bob divided by the overall number of secret bits generated, which is defined as
where l is the length of keys and (I TX (i ), I RX (i )) are the i th secret bits in transmitter and receiver, respectively. Key bit mismatch in produced secret keys happens when the power of some noise samples is larger than the power of some received OFDM samples and simultaneously they have a reversed polarity. In this state, the polarity of these OFDM samples is inversed while arriving at RX. As a consequence, the keys generated in TX and RX are mismatched. Fig. 4 illustrates the influence of AWGN channel on the polarity of the OFDM samples.
To combat the channel effect, we suggest to select a segment of CP samples placed in the region of low channel impact (safe region) to produce the secret keys. Likewise, the CP samples must be altered before sending in order that the system assures the polarity of the CP samples is not inversed when flying over the channel. Because the CP signal does not convey any information, it does not matter if it is altered. First, we study the impact of AWGN channel on our system performance. Suppose a value q, which is denoted as
where m L is the largest noise component among L samples, ∝ is a secure parameter which ensures the amount q is continually larger than the maximal absolute quantity of the noise. For a Gaussian distribution
is obtained as follows. For any arbitrary γ > 0, we can utilize Jensen's inequality as
= L e γ 2 σ 2 n 2 (15) 
Since the above inequality applies for any γ > 0, we can choose γ that gives the optimum bound. By using the arithmetic mean -geometric mean (AM-GM) inequality, resulting in
Therefore, q can be given as
Now let's take into account the impact of multipath channel on our system performance. The impact of channel can be written as
In this case, the value q may be written as
When zero forcing equalizer is used, the effect of channel after equalization becomes
For simplicity, assume the channel impulse response can be represented as a linear time-invariant filter. Because n is a Gaussian process with N (0, σ 2 n ), e will likewise be a Gaussian process with N (0, σ 2 e ), where its variance σ 2 e is given as
where H (ω) is the channel frequency response and nn (ω) is the power spectral density (PSD) of the AWGN process n. The PSD of n is defined as
ther mal (ω) = N 0 (27) sh ot (ω) = 2Q e r P r + I bg I 2 .
Now, q can be found as
To reduce the impact of the channel, TX can do one of the following procedures: 1) Procedure 1: Alice can sum +q to every positive CP sample and −q to every negative CP sample. This process demands an estimate of the channel impact among Alice and Bob. 2) Procedure 2: Because the scheme is only concerned in the polarity of the CP samples, Alice can transmit +q rather than every positive CP sample and −q rather than negative CP sample. This process sends the samples with the minimum sending power. Nevertheless, it demands rigorously an estimate of the channel effect. 3) Procedure 3: Transmit some value not relevant to q and larger than noise power like the mean or the median of the absolute value of the CP samples . In this procedure, TX transmits +A i or +M i rather than every positive CP sample and −A i or −M i rather than every negative CP sample. This procedure relaxes the need of the channel impact estimation. 4) Procedure 4: The system can only utilize one key like k 0 , which is generated from S 0 at the time of connection setup, during communication. Since S 0 is an arbitrary training signal, this signal can be adapted utilizing the former procedures to reduce the channel impact. This process relaxes the encryption and yet the computational security against passive eavesdroppers is reduced.
Computational Security of the Proposed Protocol
The cryptographic technique utilized in the IEEE 802.15.7 standard is based on symmetric-key cryptography (128 bit AES) [13] . It employs keys which are generated by higher layer processes. The protected frame utilizes a key shared between transmitter and receiver. This key may be listened by potential eavesdroppers. So this cryptographic mechanism protect the link against outsider users and not against potential eavesdroppers. Our proposed protocol produces secret keys which are generated randomly from the output of OFDM samples. Since these keys are generated only by the transmitter and the intended receiver and no sharing of secret keys through channel, our protocol provides a robust security against passive eavesdroppers. In addition to that, our protocol encrypts each signal frame by a different key whereas common cryptographic protocols encrypt The works in [21] - [29] Limitations and challenges
Proposed for wireless optical OFDM system only Key distribution and management
The dynamicity of the channel Key use Different generated key for each signal frame
One key for the session period (session key) due to complexity of key management. More than one key utilized, lower transmission rate.
One key for the session period due to the limited dynamicity of the channel and low key generation rate. More than one key utilized, lower transmission rate.
Key generation Rate (KGR)
On the fly Low Low the whole session by the same secret key for the same throughput performance. If the traditional cryptographic system requires to encrypt each frame by a different key, the process will require key distribution and management after the transmission of each frame. In this case, key management becomes very complex and not practical. It also causes long transmission delay and consequently exhibits low throughput performance. As a result, a very higher computational security is achieved by our scheme when compared with the common cryptographic encryption techniques for the same throughput performance. The works in [21-[29] propose methods to generate encryption keys by exploiting the wireless radio channels properties. Although these methods relax the complexity of key management to generate keys, its key generation rate (KGR) is low due to the limitation of the dynamicity of the channel.
We can calculate the computational complexity for exhaustive search required by eavesdroppers to detect unauthorized frames in our proposed protocol. Let N is the number of OFDM subcarriers. The primary key k 0 , which is generated from S 0 , has an effective length of ( l 0 = N ). The CP key, which is generated from the CP samples S c during session period, has a length of ( l c = N /γ), where γ is the relative length of the data samples S d and the part of the CP samples S c utilized for key generation.
To implement exhaustive search, the adversary needs to try O (2 N ) rounds to retrieve the first Table 1 compares some features between the proposed protocol, the common cryptographic encryption protocols [30] , and the works in [21] - [29] .
The Encryption at the MAC Level
The security services provided by encryption in IEEE standard 802.15.7 are optional. Therefore, there is a high risk in security when the encryption is turned off by default. Even if the encryption is turned on, the standard uses symmetric key cryptography (private key is distributed through channel) and does not define protection for the distribution of the encryption keys [13] . Unlike IEEE standard 802.15.7, our protocol protects the encryption keys since these keys are generated in the TX and RX themselves and there is no distribution of the encryption keys through channel. In addition, the encryption in MAC sublayer can be shut off without any danger in secrecy because our scheme implement physical layer security as well. As shown in Figs. 2 and 3 in section II, all OFDM transmitted signals are hidden by different generated keys before transmission. Therefore, no risk is imposed when encryption in MAC sublayer is turned off. Turning off the encryption in MAC sublayer can decrease the processing delay in MAC level and consequently improve the throughput of the system.
Numerical Results and Discussion
We utilized Monte Carlo simulation to implement our scheme, illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3 . The OFDM subcarriers number in our setup is (N = 512) unless otherwise determined. So, the number of symbols to inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT) is 256 symbols. One quarter of subcarriers (N /4 = 128 symbols) is utilized for CP.
According to the standards, the illumination of the room must meet the minimum levels, yielding in a very high SNR more than 30 dB through the whole room [11] . Let P r be the received optical power, the electrical SNR (SNR ele ) is related to the optical SNR (SNR opt ) in VLC as follows:
From (30), SNR ele is proportional to the square of SNR opt . In indoor visible light communication networks, the high SNR op t yielded due to the requirement of illumination leads to a very high SNR ele . Fig. 5 illustrates the clean (noise-free) CP samples, AWGN noise samples, the levels ±q which are calculated in accordance with (18) , and the mean ±A for the CP samples. Fig. 5 is created at SNR ele of 30 dB for 32-QAM OFDM scheme. We assume r .H (0) is normalized in order that r .H (0) = 1. In indoor VLC environment, the signal power is very large when compared with noise because of the illumination requirements [11] . Therefore, a little amount of q in respect to the CP samples is adequate to overcome AWGN. Fig. 6 illustrates the clean CP samples, the impact of the channel (h −1 ⊗ n), the levels ±q computed for the noise samples placed in the region of small channel impact (safe region), and the mean ±A . We suppose a multipath channel with line of sight path and three order reflections. The gain of the four paths are supposed to be normalized so that r .H(0) = 0.4, r .H(1) = 0.3, r .H(2) = 0.2, and r .H(3) = 0.1. As illustrated in Fig. 6 , the impact of multipath channel is so little in the safe region. This amount is insignificant relative to the OFDM Samples in the indoor environment of VLC on account of the illumination requirements. As a result, an efficient key with nil mismatch rate is possibly generated from the CP samples placed in the safe area when utilizing one of the considered procedures. Fig. 7 compares the computation complexity required by the eavesdroppers for exhaustive search to detect unauthorized frames between the first three procedures and the fourth procedure for different number of subcarriers N . The CP length is (N /4) for every state. We utilized the last half of the CP samples ( l c = N /8, γ = 8) for keys creation. As shown in Fig. 7 , the computational security supported by the first three procedures is very high, when compared with the security supported by the fourth procedure, since every signal frame is encrypted by a various key. For example, when (N = 512), the first three procedures support a computational complexity of (10 327 , 10 721 , 10 1098 ) which is required by the eavesdroppers for exhaustive search to detect (10, 30and50) unauthorized frames respectively compared to a computational complexity of (10 154 ) supported by the fourth procedure. Fig. 8 compares the variation in the mean SNR ele just after utilizing the first three procedures in respect to SNR ele of 30 dB (the SNR of sending the OFDM signal when no adaptation is made on the CP signal for the purpose of key extraction and encryption) for 1000 frames in different number of subcarriers N . The first procedure demands the largest SNR ele because it adds (±q = ±1.5 · (σ e 2 · log(L ))) to every CP samples. The second procedure accomplishes the least SNR ele since it transmits the CP signal with the minimum sending power. In order for key extraction with nil mismatch rate, the two procedures demand channel estimation. The third procedure attains less SNR ele as compared to the first procedure and yet larger than the second procedure. Notwithstanding, it does not demand an estimation of the channel effect. The peak to average power ratio (PAPR) is one of principal causes that affect the performance of OFDM signal. Fig. 9 compares the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 32 QAM-OFDM signal generated by our system using the first three procedures to the CDF of 32 QAM-OFDM signal generated by the conventional OFDM system. It is obvious that the CDF curve of the signal produced by the first procedure reaches the highest probability faster than other curves. Adding ±q to every CP samples in the first procedure leads to increasing the average of the whole OFDM signal and consequently decreasing the PAPR of the whole OFDM signal. So, our scheme using the first procedure improves PAPR performance of the signal. In the case of procedure 2, the CDF curve of the signal is slow when compared with other curves. Transmitting CP samples with the least transmission power leads to decreasing the average of the whole OFDM signal and consequently increasing the PAPR of the whole OFDM signal. So, the second procedure in our protocol worsen PAPR characteristics. In the case of procedure 3, its CDF curve is close to the CDF curve of the conventional OFDM signal and the difference at 0.45 probability is 0.2 dB.
The solid curves in Fig. 10 compare the end to end performance of our scheme, using the first three procedures, to the conventional OFDM system. We utilized the last half of the CP samples (N /8 = 64) for key extraction and q = 1.5 · (σ e 2 · log(L )). As illustrated in Fig. 10 , just the legitimate user can retrieve the secure data. As shown in Fig. 10 , the first and second procedures start nearly following the conventional OFDM at SNR ele of 7 dB, whereas the third procedure starts following the conventional OFDM at SNR ele of 23 dB. Therefore, the first and second procedures superior to third procedure in low-SNR ele performance. For a target BER of (3 × 10 −3 ), the system can control the dimming with taking into account a successful transmission in less energy consumption.
The extra y-axis at the right compares the KDR of our system utilizing the first three procedures to the KDR when no modification is made on the CP samples as in the conventional OFDM system. Although the KDR when no modification is made on the CP samples is very small when compared with the three our procedures at low SNR ele , it does not becomes zero until around 43 dB. Fig. 10 shows the first and second procedures achieve zero KDR at SNR ele of 9 dB, while the third procedure achieves zero KDR at SNR ele of 23 dB. As shown in Fig. 10 , the three procedures accomplish zero KDR before the target performance of the system (BER of 3 × 10 −3 at 29 dB). Therefore, the intended user can recover the transmitted data using the corresponding decryption key. If no modification of CP samples is made, the system will require to operate at high SNR ele beyond 43 dB to insure zero KDR so that the intended receiver can retrieve the transmitted data using the corresponding decryption key.
Some features of the four procedures such as computational security, PAPR and KDR are compared in Table 2 . As shown in Table 2 , the third procedure is the optimum procedure to support key extraction with zero mismatch rate and with low complexity for the following reasons:
r It supports very high computational security. r No considerable change in PAPR when compared with the conventional OFDM. r It achieves zero KDR before the target performance of the system (BER of 3 × 10 −3 ).
r It achieves lower SNR ele than the conventional OFDM system. r It does not require an estimate of the channel impact. Fig. 11 illustrates a picture received at the legitimate user and eavesdropper. With our protocol, the transmitted picture cannot be retrieved at the eavesdropper at all, which supports a secure transmission at physical level.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a robust key extraction protocol for optical OFDM system to secure the transmitted information in indoor VLC networks. The bipolar real signals produced at the output of optical OFDM system are exploited to obtain encryption keys to secure VLC links against passive eavesdroppers. The proposed scheme provides high physical-layer security because it encrypts each signal frame by a different key. It also attains zero bit disagreement rate with key extraction on the fly.
